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Opinions

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Judge Ben T. Barry

The court found that a prior order involving divorce-related obligations between the debtor and the debtor’s ex-spouse did not inure to the benefit of third-party creditor sufficient to deny the dischargeability of the debtor’s obligation to the creditor.

After granting the debtor’s motion for reconsideration, the court granted the creditor’s motion for summary judgment. The debtor argued that it could use § 544 to avoid the transfer of a royalty agreement between it and the creditor because the creditor did not record the agreement in the land recorded pre-petition. The creditor argued that the royalty agreement was listed by the debtor as an executory contract in its schedules, and later sold to a third party purchaser. The court found that two earlier orders of the court unequivocally transferred all liabilities and obligations of the debtor, including the royalty agreement, to the third party purchaser, thus eliminating any avoidance action the debtor may have had under § 544 relating to the royalty agreement.

Creditor filed a complaint to deny the joint debtors' chapter 7 discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5). The Court granted the relief requested in the complaint under § 727(a)(2) and (a)(4)(A) as to one debtor but denied the relief requested as to the other debtor.

Court grants partial summary judgment based on doctrine of collateral estoppel and state court findings of breach of fiduciary capacity.

Creditor filed a motion to dismiss debtor's chapter 11 case for gross mismanagement of the estate and the absence of reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. The Court granted creditor's motion to dismiss under s 1112(b)(4)(A) because of a substantial or continuing loss to the estate and an absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. However, because the creditor did not request conversion in its motion, dismissal was conditioned on the Court finding that it is not in the best interests of the estate or the estate's creditors to convert the case to a case under chapter 7 in a subsequent hearing.

The court granted creditor’s motion to dismiss; the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction for the enforcement of a post-confirmation employment agreement between two non-debtors that would have no effect on the bankruptcy estate.

In this chapter 13 case, the court applied the same factors previously recognized by the Eighth Circuit for determining good faith under § 1307(c) and § 1325(a)(3) to § 1325(a)(7). Because the objecting creditor failed to produce sufficient evidence to support her motion to reconvert and many of her substantive objections, the court denied her motion and overruled all but two of her objections to confirmation, which related to a domestic support claim and the debtor’s applicable commitment period.

The court found that provisions of an LLC operating agreement and Arkansas statute that make the filing of a bankruptcy petition an event of disassociation are invalid and not enforceable.

The Court denied a creditor's complaint to determine the dischargeability of debt under section 523(a)(2)(B) because the creditor did not prove that the debtor possessed the requisite intent to deceive or that the creditor reasonably relied on the debtor's financial statement in extending credit.

The debtor’s former employer requested a determination of dischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(6) for damages arising from an alleged breach of a non-competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality agreement signed by the debtor during employment. The Court found that the non-competition provision of the agreement was not valid, and that the employer did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the debtor violated the remaining provisions of the agreement. Because this resulted in a finding that there was no underlying debt, the Court denied the employer’s causes of action under § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(6).

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