Court was not collaterally estopped from finding that Debtor lacked intent required for a determination of nondischargeability pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), where state court default judgment rested on the two independent grounds of (1) default and (2) fraud. In such circumstances, collateral estoppel applies only to findings that are essential to the judgment under both theories of liability that are the basis of the judgment. Fraudulent intent was not an element of default and therefore not essential to the judgment. After an evidentiary hearing, the Court found that Debtor lacked fraudulent intent and the debt was therefore dischargeable. First Security Bank v. Hudson (In re Hudson), 428 B.R. 866 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010).
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Audrey R. Evans
On creditor's complaint, the Court denied Debtors' discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (false oath). Debtors filed petition and amended petition that failed to disclose numerous transfers listed in the complaint. When making eve-of-trial amendments disclosing the transfers, Debtors still failed to disclose a $33,000 race car, which the Court found Debtors both owned and controlled. Additional inaccuracies in the petition and testimony corroborated creditor's claim that Debtors knowingly and fraudulently made false oaths despite their contention that the mistakes on their original Petition and First Amended Petition were simply innocent omissions and errors. Watson v. Andrews (In re Andrews),428 B.R.855 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010).
Court adopted Judge James G. Mixon’s opinion in In re Johnson, 407 B.R. 364 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009), holding that where assignor has a perfected security interest in a vehicle under Arkansas’ certificate of title statute prior to its assignment, the assignee remains perfected against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor, even if the assignee takes no action to change the name on the certificate of title. Further, the Court found that because no “new” lien was created by an assignment, Defendant was not required to release the lien and comply with the requirements of A.C.A. § 27-14-909. Gaines v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Gaines), 414 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).
Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss in part, finding that Plaintiffs stated a claim for relief for reconsideration of a claim under 11 U.S.C. s. 502(j) and under FRBP 2016, where the ultimate amount paid to Defendant at the close of Plaintiffs' bankruptcy case was alleged to include fees and charges not included on a proof of claim. Court also found that Plaintiffs stated a claim for relief under 11 U.S.C. s. 524 for violation of the discharge injunction where it was alleged that certain fees and charges were included in the Plaintiffs' discharge but collected after the discharge was entered, and that Plaintiffs stated a claim for relief under 11 U.S.C. s. 362 for violation of the automatic stay where Defendant allegedly collected unapproved fees and charges from estate property prior to the entry of Plaintiffs' discharge. Court found that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief under 11 U.S.C. s. 506(b), and failed to state a claim for relief with respect to allegations the automatic stay was violated after the entry of the Plaintiffs' discharge. Moffitt v. America's Servicing Company (In re Moffitt), 408 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).
On Defendant's Motion to Dismiss adversary proceeding filed in a reopened bankruptcy case post-discharge, the Court found it has subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under the bankruptcy code and involving amounts paid pursuant to a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, but does not have subject matter jurisdiction over federal and state law claims because there was no longer an estate for the claims to affect. Moffitt v. America's Servicing Company (In re Moffitt),406 B.R. 825 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).
Court set aside an ex parte order granting relief from the automatic stay pursuant to FRBP 9024 and 11 U.S.C. §105, finding the Creditor’s simultaneous use of the power of the Bankruptcy Court and the power of the State Court to be an extraordinary fact justifying such relief. The Debtor paid the full amount of the Creditor’s secured claim in bankruptcy via a wage deduction order, and the Creditor accepted these payments (treating the Debtor as owner of the home securing the debt); at the same time, in State Court, Creditor sought to evict Debtor from the same home as a tenant behind in her rent payments (asserting Creditor was the true owner of the home). The Court found that setting aside the ex parte Order Lifting Stay was necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. In re Clark,409 B.R. 906 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).
On Defendant's Motion to Dismiss adversary proceeding filed in a reopened bankruptcy case post-discharge, the Court found it has subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under the bankruptcy code and involving amounts paid pursuant to a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, but does not have subject matter jurisdiction over federal and state law claims because there was no longer an estate for the claims to affect. Moffitt v. America's Servicing Company (In re Moffitt), 406 B.R. 825 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).
In overruling Debtors’ Objection to Claim 4 of American Express Centurion Bank, the Court, applying Arkansas law, found that the credit card debt, which was evidenced by a written agreement, met all the necessary requirements for a written contract for purposes of applying the five-year statute of limitations. In re Brown, 403 B.R. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).
Court found Plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to justify entry of default judgment on claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(b) and 362, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, but found that sufficient facts were pled to warrant default judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and for state law breach of contract. A hearing on damages is to be set by subsequent notice. Price v. America's Servicing Company (In re Price), 403 B.R. 775 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2009).
Upon trustee's complaint, the Court found that the Debtor abused the bankruptcy process by her actions and demonstrated bad faith in her filings. Consequently, the Court employed its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to bar the Debtor from filing any case under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code anywhere in the United States for a period of five (5) years. Not selected for publication.