Debtors’ counsel filed a Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay prior to the expiration of the automatic stay (to the extent provided in section 362(c)(3)(A)), but counsel noticed the motions out for a period that extended beyond the expiration of the thirty day automatic stay. Accordingly, the Court held that it could not extend the stay once expired, and also noted that it could not impose a stay because a motion to impose the stay had not been timely filed under section 362(c)(4). Orders amended to reflect that reference to procedure posted on website is only that of Judge Evans. Not selected for publication.
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Opinions
Notice: Not all of the Judges Opinions will be made available on this site. Individual Judges have the option of specifying that all, some or none of their opinions be posted.
Audrey R. Evans
Court found that under the facts of this case, a real estate installment contract was not a mortgage or mortgage substitute under Arkansas law, but was an executory contract with a valid forfeiture clause. Because the forfeiture clause was not waived by the sellers, and the sellers canceled the contract prior to the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, the Court found that the Debtors had no equitable or legal interest in the property. 345 B.R. 656 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
In overruling Creditor's Objection to Confirmation of Plan, the Court adopted the legal analysis of § 1322(c)(2) in In re Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) and found that § 1322(c)(2) permits the bifurcation of an undersecured mortgage on a Chapter 13 debtor's principal residence when the mortgage matured before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Not selected for publication.
Because attorney Norman D. Angeleri failed to adequately represent clients, made false statements in signed pleadings, and failed to follow court orders, Court ordered him to disgorge fees paid by his clients, referred him to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct, and referred him to the U.S. Attorney for investigation of possible bankruptcy crimes. An Order to Show Cause was also entered ordering him to appear and show cause why he should not be suspended from practicing before the Bankruptcy Court. 341 B.R. 666 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
Court denied motion to impose an automatic stay under section 362(c)(4)(B) to a case where the stay had expired as provided in section 362(c)(3)(A) because the motion to impose a stay was not filed within 30 days of the bankruptcy petition filing. 339 B.R. 474 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
Court adopted Judge Marvin Isgur’s ruling in In re Hernan Toro-Arcila, 334 B.R. 224 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005), holding that section 362(c)(4)(B) applies to cases in which the automatic stay has expired under section 362(c)(3)(A) provided a motion to impose an automatic stay is filed within 30 days of the bankruptcy petition filing. 339 B.R. 472 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
Motion for Extension of Time to File Certificate denied because a "Certification Regarding Exigent Circumstances" (a separate document prepared by the Debtor’s counsel which meets the requirements set forth in § 109(h)(3)(A)) should be filed instead using the ECF event labeled “Exigent Circumstances re: Credit Counseling” (under miscellaneous events). Not selected for publication.
Court denied Debtor's Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay because it was filed the same day that the automatic stay (as limited by § 362(c)(3)(A)) expired, and the Court may only extend the automatic stay after notice has been provided and a hearing completed before the expiration of the automatic stay. Not selected for publication.
In re Hamilton. Although Judge Evans's procedure with respect to motions to extend the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. s. 362(c)(3)(B) is to set such motions for hearing before the thirty-day automatic stay expires, the pleading in this instance was stricken due to its many errors and omissions. Not selected for publication.
In re Betty Faye Brown. Where Debtor’s rights in her residence were extinguished under Arkansas' Statutory Foreclosure Act prior to Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the residence was not property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and this Court had no jurisdiction to alter Creditor’s rights in the Property through a confirmed chapter 13 plan. Not selected for publication.