After granting the debtor’s motion for reconsideration, the court granted the creditor’s motion for summary judgment. The debtor argued that it could use § 544 to avoid the transfer of a royalty agreement between it and the creditor because the creditor did not record the agreement in the land recorded pre-petition. The creditor argued that the royalty agreement was listed by the debtor as an executory contract in its schedules, and later sold to a third party purchaser. The court found that two earlier orders of the court unequivocally transferred all liabilities and obligations of the debtor, including the royalty agreement, to the third party purchaser, thus eliminating any avoidance action the debtor may have had under § 544 relating to the royalty agreement.
You are here
Opinions
Notice: Not all of the Judges Opinions will be made available on this site. Individual Judges have the option of specifying that all, some or none of their opinions be posted.
Judge Ben T. Barry
Creditor filed a complaint to deny the joint debtors' chapter 7 discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), (3), (4), and (5). The Court granted the relief requested in the complaint under § 727(a)(2) and (a)(4)(A) as to one debtor but denied the relief requested as to the other debtor.
Court grants partial summary judgment based on doctrine of collateral estoppel and state court findings of breach of fiduciary capacity.
Creditor filed a motion to dismiss debtor's chapter 11 case for gross mismanagement of the estate and the absence of reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. The Court granted creditor's motion to dismiss under s 1112(b)(4)(A) because of a substantial or continuing loss to the estate and an absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation. However, because the creditor did not request conversion in its motion, dismissal was conditioned on the Court finding that it is not in the best interests of the estate or the estate's creditors to convert the case to a case under chapter 7 in a subsequent hearing.
The court granted creditor’s motion to dismiss; the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction for the enforcement of a post-confirmation employment agreement between two non-debtors that would have no effect on the bankruptcy estate.
Audrey R. Evans
Court granted summary judgment on plaintiff's preferential transfer complaint finding that the Debtors had a contractual right to certain payments transferred to a creditor on their behalf within the preference period. The Court further found that the payments enabled the creditor to receive more than it would receive under a hypothetical Chapter 7 case.In re Frankum, 453 B.R. 352 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).
Court previously entered an Order suspending an attorney from practicing before the Arkansas Bankruptcy Courts while allowing the attorney 14 days to make arrangements for the continued protection of his clients’ interests (In re Burnett). Five days after entry of the suspension Order, the attorney filed a new bankruptcy case. After a hearing on an Order to Show Cause, the Court rejected the attorney's contention that he filed the new case for the protection of the clients' interests and found that the duties and responsibilities an attorney owes to a bankruptcy client extend beyond the mere preparation and filing of the case. As a result, the Court held attorney in contempt and entered sanctions.In re Burnett, 455 B.R. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).
Court sustained creditors’ objection to Debtors’ claimed homestead exemption for real property on which they did not live at the time they filed bankruptcy where Debtors previously abandoned the property as a homestead and neither returned to it nor impressed upon it any characteristics of a homestead at the time they filed bankruptcy. The Court determined that the debtors’ intention to move back onto the property at some point in the future did not satisfy the requirements for claiming a homestead exemption under Arkansas law. In re Ellis, 456 B.R. 401 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011).
Judge Richard D. Taylor
James G. Mixon
The creditor's claim was disallowed. Neither of the writings were enforceable contracts. The only enforceable agreement, the oral agreement for $250,000.00, had been paid in full. The creditor failed to meet his burden of proof that the initial agreement was for anything more than $250,000.00. Attorneys' fees were not appropriate as both parties were responsible for the writings that led to the litigation.