Debtors’ counsel filed a Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay prior to the expiration of the automatic stay (to the extent provided in section 362(c)(3)(A)), but counsel noticed the motions out for a period that extended beyond the expiration of the thirty day automatic stay. Accordingly, the Court held that it could not extend the stay once expired, and also noted that it could not impose a stay because a motion to impose the stay had not been timely filed under section 362(c)(4). Orders amended to reflect that reference to procedure posted on website is only that of Judge Evans. Not selected for publication.
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Opinions
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Audrey R. Evans
Debtors’ counsel filed a Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay prior to the expiration of the automatic stay (to the extent provided in section 362(c)(3)(A)), but counsel noticed the motions out for a period that extended beyond the expiration of the thirty day automatic stay. Accordingly, the Court held that it could not extend the stay once expired, and also noted that it could not impose a stay because a motion to impose the stay had not been timely filed under section 362(c)(4). Orders amended to reflect that reference to procedure posted on website is only that of Judge Evans. Not selected for publication.
Court found that under the facts of this case, a real estate installment contract was not a mortgage or mortgage substitute under Arkansas law, but was an executory contract with a valid forfeiture clause. Because the forfeiture clause was not waived by the sellers, and the sellers canceled the contract prior to the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, the Court found that the Debtors had no equitable or legal interest in the property. 345 B.R. 656 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
In overruling Creditor's Objection to Confirmation of Plan, the Court adopted the legal analysis of § 1322(c)(2) in In re Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) and found that § 1322(c)(2) permits the bifurcation of an undersecured mortgage on a Chapter 13 debtor's principal residence when the mortgage matured before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Not selected for publication.
Because attorney Norman D. Angeleri failed to adequately represent clients, made false statements in signed pleadings, and failed to follow court orders, Court ordered him to disgorge fees paid by his clients, referred him to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct, and referred him to the U.S. Attorney for investigation of possible bankruptcy crimes. An Order to Show Cause was also entered ordering him to appear and show cause why he should not be suspended from practicing before the Bankruptcy Court. 341 B.R. 666 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
Court denied motion to impose an automatic stay under section 362(c)(4)(B) to a case where the stay had expired as provided in section 362(c)(3)(A) because the motion to impose a stay was not filed within 30 days of the bankruptcy petition filing. 339 B.R. 474 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006).
Judge Richard D. Taylor
Court determined that corporate officer/debtor was personally liable for insufficient funds checks written on the company account, and that the resulting debt was non-dischargeable in the debtor’s personal bankruptcy case under § 523(a)(2)(A).
The court found that breach of contract damages were excepted from discharge even though the total damages exceeded the “money obtained” from the creditor. Once the court found that specific money had been obtained by false pretense, false representation, or actual fraud under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), any debt arising therefrom is excepted from discharge.
Principles of collateral estoppel require the granting of the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. If the debtor knew he did not have a sufficient basis to make a representation, but made the representation anyway, the representation was made with a reckless disregard for the truth, which satisfies the knowledge requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
Debtor’s discharge denied because schedules were incomplete, false, and misleading.